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NOTES

The
Misadventures:
Medication
Interaction of International Reference
Pricing and Parallel Trade in the
Pharmaceutical Industry
ABSTRACT

Governments in developing countries seeking to combat the
rising costs of health care have increasingly focused on the
pharmaceutical industry. They often set the amount they will
pay for pharmaceutical prices through reference to other
countries' prices when negotiating with pharmaceutical
companies in an effort to control health care expenditures. This
system of international reference pricing inhibits access to
essential pharmaceuticals in underdeveloped countries and
decreases pharmaceutical innovation and equitable research
and development cost-sharingbetween developed countries.
This Note explores the tension between market forces in the
pharmaceutical industry and promoting pharmaceutical
innovation, equitable research, development cost-sharing, and
access to affordable drugs in underdeveloped countries. The
interaction of parallel trade and the lack of international
regulation or restriction on the practice of international
reference pricing causes this tension. The United States should
enter into a series of free trade agreements with developed
countries that utilize international reference pricing for
pharmaceuticalsproviding for pricing principles restricting or
limiting the practice of reference pricing, parallel trade, and
other inhibitionson a socially optimal pharmaceuticalmarket.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the Swiss drug manufacturer Novartis challenged
South Korea's pharmaceutical
pricing policy, warning the
government that it would be denied its chronic myeloid leukemia
drug Gleevec/Glivec if it refused to pay a reasonable price for the
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product.1 Meanwhile, due to European government cost-containment
measures, the top sixteen pharmaceutical companies only launched
ten new products in Europe last year, a drop for the second
consecutive year. 2 Governments seeking to reduce escalating healthcare costs increasingly focus on the pharmaceutical industry. 3 A
growing practice has been for developed countries' governments to set
the amount they will pay for pharmaceutical prices by reference to
other countries' prices in negotiations with pharmaceutical companies
to control health care expenditures. 4 This system of international
reference pricing has inhibited access to essential pharmaceuticals in
some countries and contributed to a decrease in new pharmaceutical
development.
While this trend may appear consistent with notions of free trade
and freedom of contract, it is far from ideal because of the nature of
the pharmaceutical industry. This industry presents two primary
competing interests: ensuring incentives for pharmaceutical research
and development (R&D) and providing widespread consumer access
Applied to pharmaceuticals,
to affordable pharmaceuticals.
international reference pricing and parallel trade decrease R&D
incentives, inhibit equitable R&D cost-sharing between developed
countries, and decrease underdeveloped countries' access to
5
affordable pharmaceuticals.
This Note explores the tension between market forces in the
pharmaceutical industry, promoting pharmaceutical R&D, equitable
R&D cost-sharing between developed countries, and access to
affordable drugs in underdeveloped countries. This Note focuses on
how parallel trade and the lack of international regulation or
restriction on the practice of international reference pricing interact
to cause this tension. Part II discusses the pharmaceutical industry
and how it differs from other industries. Part III discusses the
concept of international reference pricing and its role as an

South Korean Drug PricingChallenged, PHARMA MARKETLETTER (London),
1.
Aug. 12, 2002.
2.
Declining Drug Launches in Europe Drives Imperative for Sustained
Lifecycle Pricing,PHARMA MARKETLETrER (London), July 22, 2002. These statistics are
based on a study by Cambridge Pharma Consulting entitled European Pricing and
Reimbursement Review 2001.
3.
See Pharma"Is Losing Control of Pricing,and Must Present a United Case
Now:" KPMG, PHARMA MARKETLETTER, (London), June 17, 2002. Controlling increased
health care expenditures by driving down drug prices is high on the agenda of
governments around the world, according to John Morris, head of KPMG's
pharmaceutical practice.
Id.
4.
5.
This Note assumes that optimal R&D of pharmaceuticals, equitable R&D
cost-sharing between developed countries, and affordable access to pharmaceuticals in
underdeveloped countries are more socially desirable conditions than low R&D
incentives, inequitable R&D cost-sharing between developed countries, and lack of
access to affordable pharmaceuticals in underdeveloped countries.
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impediment to pharmaceutical R&D, equitable R&D cost-sharing
between
developed
countries,
and
affordable
access
to
pharmaceuticals in underdeveloped countries. Part IV presents a
brief overview of the concept of parallel trade as applied to the
pharmaceutical industry. Part V analyzes the interaction of
international reference pricing and parallel trade as applied to the
pharmaceutical industry. Part VI proposes that the United States
enter into a series of free trade agreements with developed countries
that are utilizing international reference pricing for pharmaceuticals.
These agreements would provide for pricing principles restricting or
limiting the practice of reference pricing, parallel trade, and other
inhibitions on a socially optimal pharmaceutical market.

II. THE NATURE OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
A. Indications:Research and Development
The pharmaceutical industry is particularly vulnerable to
regulation because of its unique cost structure. 6 R&D costs are an

unusually large component of total product output costs. 7 Calculated
into R&D are high upfront investments, costs imposed because of
product liability, relatively low variable costs of production within
capacity for most non-biotech products, and required long payback
period dependent on patients. 8 By the time a product is launched

6.
Patricia Danzon, Can PharmaceuticalPrice Regulation and Innovation Coexist?, Remarks at Patients First, a Fraser Institute Conference (Nov. 3-4, 1997),
available at http://www.oldfraser.lexi.net/publications/forum/1998/march/health.html
(last visited Jan. 12, 2004).
7.
Id.
8.
Id.; see also Jaclyn L. Miller, Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act: The Elimination of Competition Between Drug Manufacturers, 5
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 91, 103-04 (2002).
[Birand name manufacturers spend from $400-500 million on the drugs that
survive the approval process and are marketed for consumers. However, there
are still far more drugs that brand name manufacturers pour money into which
never make it through the FDA approval process. Drug manufacturers have
stated that "every year scientists screen more than 126,000 chemicals for
potential drug development. Of that number, they will actually follow up on
about 1,000. Of that number only sixteen will ever make it through the
regulatory process and eventually appear in the pharmacy. Only one tenth of
one percent of all chemicals entering the process will finally be approved." This
means manufacturers spend millions of dollars on research and development
on compounds that most likely will never make a profit for them. Hence, the
drugs that do make it to the pharmacy must reimburse not only the money
spent to get it to market [sic], but also the money spent on researching the
other possibilities that failed.
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R&D costs, accounting for over thirty percent of total product output
costs, have already been incurred. 9 The costs remaining to be
incurred by the time the product is introduced into the market are
marginal costs, such as processing, packing, promotion, and
distribution of additional units.1 0 When pharmaceuticals are
introduced into the market, manufacturers must take into account
both R&D and marginal costs in pricing their products. It is a widely
accepted principle that industrialized countries should share R&D
costs.1 ' To what extent each country should contribute to these costs
is disputed, generally unregulated, and highly inequitable. 12 This
makes investment in pharmaceutical R&D both expensive and risky.
B. Directionsfor Use: A Primer on Patents
Despite the expense and risk associated with pharmaceutical
R&D, pharmaceutical developers invest heavily in it because they
expect ultimately to profit.' 3 Patents ensure this. Patents preserve
incentives for future R&D by limiting or delaying generic (copy
product) competition. 14 The purpose of patents is to bar generic entry

9.
Danzon, supra note 6.
10.
Id.; Patricia Danzon, Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals:Reconciling
Access, R&D and Patents,3 INT'L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & EcON. 183, 185 (2003).
11.
Sharan Parmar & Vivek Divan, Paper, Drug Financingand Price Control:
Legislative Intervention in the Public Interest (June 2002), in GLOBAL TREATMENT
ACCESS: LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AND STRATEGIES: PAPERS PREPARED FOR: PUTTING
THIRD FIRST: VACCINES, ACCESS TO TREATMENT & THE LAW (satellite meeting of the
14th International AIDS Conference, Barcelona, July 5, 2002).
12.
See, e.g., European Drug Industry Urges Japan to Reward Pharma
Innovation, PHARMA MARKETLETTER, Nov. 14, 2003 (recapping meeting between
European drugmakers and Japanese health authorities, whereby it was stressed that
"both Japan and Europe are lagging behind the United States [in pharmaceutical
innovation], and [there is an] urgent need [for Japanese authorities] to provide an
adequate environment for pharmaceutical innovation... [by] establishing pricing rules
for medicines that reward pharmaceutical innovation"); Rich Nations Must Pay More
for Drugs, Says U.S. FDA Head; Warns of Global R&D Crisis, PHARMA MARKETLETTER,
Sept. 26, 2003 (noting that the U.S. pays "most of the [global] costs of developing new
[medicines]" leading to "a global crisis over affordable, safe and innovative medicines."
Moreover, "even though people in countries such as Poland have significantly less
economic wealth than the countries of western Europe, their drug prices are, on
average, significantly higher than in France and Germany.") [hereinafter Rich Nations
Must Pay More].
13.
Christopher R. Stambaugh, Note, State Price Control Laws are the Wrong
Prescriptionfor the Problem of Unaffordable Drugs, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 897, 903 (2002); see also Heinz Redwood, Advantages and Risks of
Differential Pricing for PrescriptionDrugs, Remarks at the WHO-WTO Workshop on
Differential Pricing and Financing of Essential Drugs, in Norway (Apr. 9, 2001), at
http://www.who.int (last visited Jan. 12, 2004) ('The pharmaceutical industry has a
moral, social and financial duty to make its contribution to solving the grave medical
crisis of unaffordable access. It cannot stand apart and decorously avert its gaze. But it
is an industry, not a charity.").
14.
Danzon, supra note 10, at 185.
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into the market for the term of the patent. 15 This provides the
product's original innovator the opportunity to price above marginal
16
cost and thereby recoup their R&D expense.
C. Side Effects and Adverse Reactions:Price Controls and Differential
Pricing
For most products, particularly those manufactured on a global
scale, price differences from country to country are unlikely to be
significant. 17 Companies would incur financial losses if they sold
products at half price in developing countries.' 8 The pharmaceutical
industry is different. Financially, it would make sense for
pharmaceutical companies to take local affordability into account
when setting (profitable) price levels in each country. 19 This is
impossible to do because there is no free market for pharmaceuticals
20
in most countries.
As governments tend to be the sole purchasers of
pharmaceuticals for an entire state or country, they have a great deal
of market power to influence price. 2 1 In the pharmaceutical market,
the method of sale is typically between pharmaceutical companies
and the government, whereby the government negotiates directly
with each company to determine the price that will be paid for the
products. 22 The government, or a government-sanctioned body,
reviews company price applications and determines whether the

15.
Id.
16.
Id. Because the original innovator has already performed the R&D, it is
unnecessary for generic manufacturers to invest in these duplicative costs. Generic
manufacturers may simply "copy" the original innovator's end product. Consequently,
generic manufacturers may price products at marginal cost because there is no R&D
expense to recoup. Of course, given the choice between an expensive brand-name drug
and a vastly less expensive duplicate, the rational purchaser will chose the duplicate,
preventing the original innovator from sufficient profit to recoup its R&D expense.
17.
Ed Schoonveld, Market Segmentation and International Price Referencing,
Remarks at the WHO-WTO Workshop on Differential Pricing and Financing of
Essential Drugs, in Norway (Apr. 9, 2001), available at http://www.who.int (last visited
Feb. 16, 2004).
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
Emma Squire, Differential Pricing and the Problem of Access to Essential
Medicines in Developing Countries (2002) (Degree of Master of European Studies
thesis, College of Europe, Bruges Campus), available at http://www.EFPIAaward2002.
htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2004).
22.
Bruce Stuart et al., Appendix A: Issues in Prescription Drug Coverage,
Pricing, Utilization, and Spending: What We Know and Need to Know (Feb. 18, 2000)
(report prepared for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Policy and Evaluation, Office of Health Policy), available at
http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/drugstudy/appa-4.htm
(last visited Feb. 16,
2004).
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company's requested price is "fair." If it is not "fair," the government
may set a lower price. 23 If that price is lower than the company
24
requested, the company typically has a right to appeal the decision.
In any case, the pharmaceutical company is not obligated to sell if the
government they are dealing with cannot negotiate satisfactory
25
terms.
Because there is no free market for pharmaceuticals in most
countries, these countries impose price controls on pharmaceuticals
sold within their borders. 26 These price controls ensure more
affordable drugs for their consumers but provide less profit for the
pharmaceutical industry to compensate for R&D expenses, and
invariably, those profits must be recouped elsewhere. 27 While price
controls seemingly benefit consumers by regulating pharmaceutical
profit margins, they discourage innovation and competition in the
pharmaceutical industry. 28 A study examining the effects of countries'
price regulations on R&D incentives revealed that no country with
price controls has had innovative success in the pharmaceutical
industry matching that of the United States-one of the few countries
without pharmaceutical price controls. 29 From 1975 to 1989, U.S.
companies produced forty-seven significant new pharmaceutical
compounds, compared to fifty for the rest of the world. 30 Between
1970 and 1992, U.S. companies accounted for 42.8 percent of the
world's breakthrough drugs. 31 During a similar period, Britain
accounted for fourteen percent, Germany seven percent, and France
32
three percent.
Macroeconomic principles suggest that reduced profits will lead
to reduced innovation. 33 The cost of capital is low when investors
perceive a predictable profit stream, so their return is commensurate

Id.
23.
Id.
24.
There may be instances where pharmaceutical companies are obligated to
25.
provide their products to a country despite their lack of approval for the offered price.
Such situations may occur under the threat of compulsory licensing. A compulsory
license is a judicial or government annulment of patent rights, in effect removing the
patentee's exclusivity, allowing others to make, use and sell the product before patent
expiration. Article 31 of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Agreement allows countries to grant compulsory licenses in limited circumstances.
Michelle M. Nerozzi, Note, The Battle Over Life-Saving Pharmaceuticals: Are
Developing Countries Being "TRIPped" by Developed Countries?, 47 VILL. L. REV. 605,
612-13 (2002).
26.
See Jerry Stanton, Lesson for the United States from Foreign Price Controls
on Pharmaceuticals,16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 149, 165 (2000).
27.
See Nerozzi, supra note 25, at 627.
Stambaugh, supra note 13, at 913.
28.
29.
Id. at 914.
30.
Stanton, supra note 26, at 153.
Id. at 154.
31.
Id.
32.
33.
Id. at 168.

534

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 37527

with their risk. 34 When that profit stream is reduced,, the cost of
capital will rise to reflect the diminished return and rise an
additional quantum to reflect the uncertainty in future earnings
predictability. 35 Thus, government price controls on pharmaceuticals
decrease R&D incentives for pharmaceutical developers because
profit incentives are decreased. Because price controls may demand
prices

that cover

only slightly

more

than

the

marginal

cost of

manufacturing a drug, the pharmaceutical industry is reliant on
consumers in countries without price controls to compensate for the
low profit margin of countries imposing price controls in order to
compensate for R&D. 36 Consequently, the few countries that do not

enforce

price

controls

on

pharmaceuticals

contribute

an

overwhelming portion to the funding necessary for innovation in the
pharmaceutical industry. 37 Consumers in these countries pay a
disproportionately higher price for prescription drugs than consumers

in countries enforcing price controls. 38 This effectively allows other
3
countries to free-ride on those funding innovation.

9

Pharmaceutical manufacturers argue that they cannot rely on

price increases in less regulated markets, such as the United States,
to achieve the necessary profit levels for R&D. 40

If R&D is

to be

sustained, then, some industrialized countries must restrict price
controls and bear the financial burden of increased prescription drug
costs either through the government or consumer pockets. As a
result, the United States has pressured other countries to relax their

regulations on drug prices. 41 Still, differential pricing between

34.
Id.
35.
See id. This second aspect is based on investors' beliefs, not necessarily the
resulting objective outcome. For example, the CEO of Genzyme Corp, a major U.S.
biotech company, commented on his company's ability to raise capital while President
Clinton was trying to advance Health Security Act in 1993: "We raised $100 million for
our new gene therapy product last year. If we tried to hold an offering today we
couldn't do it. The threat of price controls has done more to damage the biotechnology
industry than anything else that has happened in the industry's history." Id.
36.
See Stambaugh, supra note 13, at 913.
37.
See Stanton, supra note 26, at 170.
The various regulatory schemes employed around the world seem to have had a
chilling effect on pharmaceutical innovation . . . While these other countries
may still partake of the fruits of American . . . pharmaceutical advancement
within their price control regimens, they have stunted domestic innovation.
Every one of these foreign countries has become dependent on the U.S ....
to
innovate.
38.
See id. at 165 (arguing that price controls hold down the price of the
targeted pharmaceutical).
39.
Stambaugh, supranote 13, at 913.
40.
Parmar & Divan, supranote 11, at n.109.
41.
Stambaugh, supra note 13, at 913.
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countries in the pharmaceutical market is prevalent. 42 It is not
uncommon for Americans to pay over twice as much as Europeans for
the same drug and dosage, leading critics to assert that the United
43
States is in fact subsidizing European health care.
To a certain extent, differential pricing in the pharmaceutical
market is ideal because it actually maximizes the total welfare of
prescription drug purchasers. 44 Differential pricing offers pricesensitive consumers, who could not afford to participate in the market
under a system-of uniform pricing, low enough prices so that they are
willing to particilate in the market and contribute to shared R&D
costs. 45 Purchasers paying the highest prices are also paying less
46
than they would for the same R&D under a uniform pricing system.
Additionally,
differential
pricing
allows
pharmaceutical
manufacturers to maximize profits and R&D because in economic
terms, differential pricing is optimal when applied to industries with
large joint costs (such as pharmaceutical R&D), relative to user47
specific marginal costs (such as the cost of manufacturing a drug).
Economist Patricia Danzon argues that differential pricing can
be maintained to resolve the competing interests in the
pharmaceutical industry and is indeed the best way to resolve the
conflict. 48 Differential pricing, however, will only be effective if
policies are initiated to prevent low prices in developing countries
from "leaking" into developed countries. 49 Such leakages occur
50
primarily due to international reference pricing and parallel trade.
51
Remarkably, these practices remain unregulated on a global scale.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers historically have had a great deal
of pricing power due to legislated patent protections under
international intellectual property law.5 2 To counter this power, most
industrialized countries use legislative measures to intervene in this
power and ensure drug affordability through systems of price
control. 53 Systems of pharmaceutical price control vary considerably

42.

See David J. Gross et al., Pricesfor PrescriptionDrugs: The Roles of Market

Forces and Government Regulation, in CONTESTED GROUND: PUBLIC PURPOSE AND
PRIVATE INTEREST IN THE REGULATION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 124, 134 (Peter Davis

ed., 1996).
43.
Tom Buerkle, EU Weighs Lifting of Price Controls-Bid to End Market
Distortions, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 18, 1998, at 20.

44.
45.
46.

Stambaugh, supra note 13, at 911.
Id.
Id.

47.

Id.

48.
49.

Danzon, supranote 10, at 192.
Id.

50.

Id.

51.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
52.
See Parmar & Divan, supra note
manufacturers enjoy a monopoly pricing power).
53.
Id.

11

(arguing

pharmaceutical
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from country to country and contain a number of elements.5 4 This
Note focuses on the element of international reference pricing.

III. INTERNATIONAL REFERENCE PRICING

55

A. InternationalReference PricingDefined
At its most basic level, international reference pricing refers to
the practice whereby a government in country.A refers to usually
lower prices in country B as a benchmark for regulating prices in
country A. 56 Reference pricing may be formally built into a country's
Ireland and
regulatory system, as in Canada, Italy, Greece, Belgium,
57
benchmark.
informal
an
be
may
or
the Netherlands,
Many European countries, including the United Kingdom, have
adopted international reference pricing schemes in setting
pharmaceutical prices.5 8 Under these systems, a reference price is
usually based on the weighted average of other countries' drug
prices.5 9 Regulators choose a group of countries (a "basket"), set the
60
weights in each country, and adjust for exchange rate movements.
This scheme provides a wide degree of latitude in pricing due to large
international price variations. 6 ' The risk under this system is that
low prices granted in underdeveloped countries will be either used as
a benchmark in setting prices in developed countries or be thrown
62
into the basket and averaged into the developed countries' prices.
For these reasons, international reference pricing is the most
important obstacle to lower pharmaceutical prices in underdeveloped
63
countries.

54.
Schoonveld, supra note 17.
In other literature, reference pricing is referred to as "benchmarking" and
55.
"external reference pricing."
Danzon, supra note 10, at 191.
56.
57.
Id.; see also Nicholas Bloom & John Van Reenen, Regulating Drug Prices:
Where Do We Go From Here?, 19 FISCAL STUD. 321, 334 n.15 (1998), available at
http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/fiscalstudiesfbloom-aug98.pdf (discussing Greece's
reference pricing scheme).
58.
Danzon, supra note 10, at 191.
Id.
59.
Id.
60.
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
See id. at 190.
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B. Reference Pricingas an Obstacle to Affordable Pharmaceuticalsin
Underdeveloped Countries
For many patients in the least developed countries, essential
medicines are unaffordable.6 4 In response, many pharmaceutical
companies have developed schemes of providing access to essential
medicines in underdeveloped countries on humanitarian and
corporate citizenship grounds. 65 While some companies offer
donations, 66 many others engage in discounted pricing or investment
programs.67 Several manufacturers offer heavily discounted prices
and
donations
to
underdeveloped
countries
for
certain
pharmaceuticals. 68 Partnerships between pharmaceutical companies
and governments, international organizations, or non-governmental
organizations
provide
discounted
pharmaceuticals. 6 9
These
partnerships include the DOTS-Plus pilot project to ensure the supply
of drugs for the treatment of multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDRTB); the 1997 UNAIDS HIV Drug Access Initiative and the
Accelerating Access Initiative, begun in May 2000, involving five
major research-based companies, UNAIDS, the World Health
Organization (WHO), and other UNAIDS partners to expand access
to care and treatment for HIV/AIDS and resulting in prices for triple
therapy as much as ninety-five percent below the initial developed70
country price.
When developed countries calculate the discounted prices given
to underdeveloped countries into the price they will pay for a product,
pharmaceutical companies become hesitant to continue the practice of
providing discounted pharmaceuticals to underdeveloped countries.
The company response is to set a single uniform price. 71 As a result,
consumers in underdeveloped countries face higher prices and
possibly denial of access to essential pharmaceuticals. 72 Thus,

64.
Squire, supra note 21.
65.
See id. §§ 1.5-1.6.
66.
Companies utilizing donation programs include Pfizer; Merck & Co. Inc.,
offering donations to treat river blindness, lymphatic filariasis, and MMR II;
GlaxoSmithKline, donating doses of the meningitis vaccine, malarial treatment, and
others; and Novartis, donating enough antileprosy multidrug therapy for all patients in
the world until the end of 2005 together with funds for shipping and independent
quality control. Squire, supra note 21, § 1.5.
67.
These companies include Abbott Laboratories, American Home Products/
Wyeth, Aventis, AstraZeneca, Bayer, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Boehringer Ingelheim, Eli
Lilly, Johnson & Johnson, Pharmacia Corporation, Roche, and Schering-Plough. Id.
68.
Id.
69.
Id.
70.
Squire, supra note 21.
71.
Patricia
Danzon,
The
Economics
of
Parallel Trade,
13
PHARMACOECONOMICS 293, 295 (1998).

72.

Id.
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because there is no regulation of international reference pricing, and
most developed countries have not restricted their behavior,
underdeveloped countries face the threat of a loss of essential
medicines.
C. Reference Pricingas an Obstacle to Equitable Joint Research and
Development Costs Between Developed Countries
One might expect countries with higher per capita income to pay
a greater proportion of R&D costs than countries with lower per
capita income and countries with similar per capita income to pay a
similar proportion of R&D costs.7 3 However, this is not entirely the
case. Some high-income countries have relatively low prices, while
some low-income countries face high prices relative to their income
level. 74 There are several reasons for this. First, regulators in some
high-income countries use their bargaining leverage, combined with
reference pricing, to reduce prices, leaving others to pay the joint cost
of R&D. 75 Second, the tendency for prices in low-income countries to
be high relative to their average per capita income likely reflects
company concerns over price leakages-that granting lower prices to
low-income countries would undermine potentially higher prices in
other countries.7 6 The concern may be that the prices low-income
countries pay for pharmaceuticals will be averaged into the highincome countries' basket of price references. 77 This cycle reveals why
international reference pricing produces highly inequitable results.
Additionally, most developed countries utilizing reference pricing
factor differing variables into their reference prices, producing
inequitable reference prices. In Canada, for example, the price for any
new product cannot exceed the median of the prices for the United
States, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom.7 8 In Denmark and Italy, prices cannot exceed the European
average price.7 9 Spain and Greece demand the lowest price in
Europe.80 In Saudi Arabia, price is referenced to a list of forty
82
countries. 8 ' The United States does not practice reference pricing.
As a result, U.S. consumers pay a significantly higher price for
pharmaceuticals than their counterparts in other developed

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See Danzon, supra note 10, at 191.
Id.
Id. at 192.
Id.
See id. at 191-92.
Schoonveld, supra note 17, § 4.1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Bloom & Van Reenen, supra note 57, at 4, tbl.i.
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countries. 83 Layering this discrepancy, these counterparts pay
inequitable portions of joint R&D costs. Thus, international reference
pricing is incompatible with the notion that developed countries
should equitably share R&D costs.
D. The Law(lessness) of InternationalReference Pricing
Currently, there is no international regulation on international
reference pricing for pharmaceuticals. Essentially, every country may
freely set the prices it will pay for pharmaceuticals then negotiate to
terms with pharmaceutical manufacturers. 84 Notably, the United
States is the only developed country that does not engage in
international reference pricing for patented pharmaceuticals.85 The
European Union, on the other hand, heavily engages in reference
pricing, as do other developed countries, such as Canada.8 6 Following
are case studies of selected countries' legal policies on the practice.
1. The United States
In the United States, President Clinton's unsuccessful 1993
Health Security Act proposal would have limited U.S. prices to the
lowest price in twenty-one reference group countries. 87 The basic
objectives of the Act for pharmaceuticals and other health care
services were universal coverage and cost control.8 8 The Act would
have set up an Advisory Council on Breakthrough Drugs that would
8 9
evaluate the reasonableness of prices for new pharmaceuticals.
Additionally, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)
would be empowered to negotiate supplementary rebates to Medicare
for any new drugs marketed at a lower price in the twenty-one
reference countries, or those deemed to have "excessive" prices. 90
Where HHS and manufacturers were unable to agree on a new drug's
price in the Medicare program, it would be excluded from coverage. 9 1
The Act would have had the effect of requiring pharmaceutical

83.

See, e.g., Rich Nations Must Pay More, supra note 12 (stating that

"Americans account for a fraction of prescription drug use worldwide, yet this year they
will pay for around half of all pharmaceutical expenditures worldwide").
84.
See Bloom & Van Reenen, supranote 57, tbl. 1, at 4.
85.
See id.
86.
Id.
87.
The Heath Security Act was introduced in the Senate by Senator George
Mitchell and in the House of Representatives by Representative Richard Gephardt on
Nov. 20, 1993. S. 1757, 103d Cong., (1993); H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993).
88.
Henry Grabowski, The Impact of the Clinton Health Care Reform Plan:
Health Reform and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1221, 1221
(1994).
89.
Id.
90.
Id.
91.
Id.
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manufacturers to comply with the U.S. reference price or be excluded
from Medicare coverage, thus replacing the free market for
pharmaceuticals with a reference pricing system. 92 Notably, most of
the twenty-one comparable countries in the proposal have
significantly lower standards of living than in the United States, and
only a few have research-intensive pharmaceutical and biotechnology
93
industries.
2. Canada
In Canada, maximum prices have been established for patented
pharmaceuticals since 1987 by setting a "ceiling" to which companies
may price products. 94 The Patented Medicine Prices Review Board
(PMPRB) fixes prices at market entry and may adjust them later if
necessary. 95 For innovative products, prices are compared to the same
product in nine other countries. 96 The Board's primary mandate is to
"prevent brand name firms from abusing their monopoly position
during the market exclusivity period. ' 97 The system has been
98
relatively successful in controlling prices in Canada.
3. New Zealand
Because New Zealand does not have a domestic pharmaceutical
industry, it has adopted punitive state-trading practices designed to
shift the principle burden of health-care cost containment to foreign
producers, such as the U.S. and European researched-based
pharmaceutical companies. 99 New Zealand has granted exclusive
control over pharmaceutical purchases and reimbursement to a statetrading entity, Pharmac. 10 0 Employing its monopsonistic pricing
power, Pharmac has implemented a "sole-source, single tendering"
system that denies U.S. and European companies "adequate

92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Global Treatment Access: Legal Developments and Strategies (papers
prepared for Putting Third First: Vaccines, Access to Treatment & the Law, A Satellite
Meeting of the 14th International AIDS Conference Barcelona, hosted by CHLN,
AIDSLaw Project, and Lawyers Collective HIV/AIDS Unit) (July 5, 2002), available at
http://www.dec.org/pdfdocs[PNACQ319.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2004).
95.
Id.
96.
Id.
97.
Stuart, supra note 22, § 4.5.1.
98.
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
99.
PhRMA, Position Paper, Bilateral and Multilateral FTA Negotiations:
Opportunities for Improved IP Protection and Market Access, Appendix B (2001),
available at http://www.phrma.org/international/resources/2001-04-12.42.pdf
(last
visited Jan. 8, 2004).
100.
Id.
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opportunity" to compete in the New Zealand market on the basis of
commercial considerations. 10 1 The result has been for pharmaceutical
companies to withhold essential medicines from the New Zealand
02
market, denying its citizens access to essential medicines.'

IV. PARALLEL TRADE
A. Parallel Trade Defined
Parallel trade occurs when a product covered by intellectual
property rights in country A is exported and resold to country B
without the right holder's authorization. 0 3 The incentive for parallel
trade is a sufficient difference in prices between countries A and B to
cover shipping and transaction costs and still offer gains to both the
0 4
shipper (country A-exporter) and the buyer (country B-importer).
B. The Law
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) was established as part of the Uruguay
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
completed in 1995 and is the most comprehensive international
agreement on intellectual property rights.' 0 5 Prior to TRIPS, few
countries had strong intellectual property protection laws.' 0 6 TRIPS
became the starting point in harmonizing the patent laws of
07
developed and developing signatory nations.'
The agreement requires World Trade Organization (WTO)
member countries to establish minimum standards of intellectual
property protection for foreign and domestic products and processes,
08
including the implementation of pharmaceutical patent laws.'

101.
Id.
102.
See id.
103.
See F.M. Scherer, The Economics of Parallel Trade in Pharmaceutical
Products, Revised Summary for WTO-WHO Workshop, Apr. 2001 (summarizing
generally F.M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Patented
Medicines in Developing Countries, 5 J. INVL ECON. L. 913 (2002)).
104.
Id.
105.
TRIPS and Development, Background Briefing (Dept. for Int'l.
Development/Trade Matters Series, London), Sept. 2001, at 1, available at
http://www.dfid.gov.uk (last visited Feb. 11, 2004); see also Samantha Shoell, Note,
Why Can't the Poor Access Lifesaving Medicines? An Exploration of Solving the Patent
Issue, 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 151, 158 (2002) (stating that 117 countries signed
the Agreement).
106.
Shoell, supra note 105, at 158.
107.
Id.
108.
Naomi A. Bass, Implications of the TRIPS Agreement for Developing
Countries:PharmaceuticalPatent Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the 21st Century,
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Despite the comprehensive requirements, however, TRIPS permits
some flexibility in the manner member countries may choose to
execute their intellectual property laws domestically. 10 9 TRIPS does
not explicitly restrict governments from controlling drug prices. 1 10
TRIPS does not prevent governments from allowing the importation
of legitimate goods from the cheapest international sources (parallel
importing). 11 1 Moreover, TRIPS allows governments to authorize use
of the subject of a patent without the patent holder's consent
(compulsory licensing). 112 Article 1.1 of TRIPS leaves WTO member
countries free to determine the appropriate method of implementing
TRIPS within their own legal system, leaving room for different
interpretations.113

Developed countries, led by the United States, interpret TRIPS
narrowly, proposing more control for patent owners. 114 The main
reason for this is that inadequate patent protection will impede
R&D." 5 Developing countries, including South Africa, India and
Thailand, interpret TRIPS broadly, proposing less control to the
patent holder. 116 While developing countries acknowledge that patent
protection is a prerequisite for R&D, they believe in balancing all
interests to prevent abuse by the patent holder. 117 By limiting patent
rights, developing countries may more easily exploit generic
competition.
Substantive provisions of international law most relevant to
patented pharmaceuticals are Section 5 of TRIPS and Article 1709 of
NAFTA." l8 TRIPS provides that patent holders are to receive
exclusive rights to prevent parties from making, using, offering for

35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 191, 191; see also Shoell, supra note 105, at 158. Prior to
TRIPS, many countries did not recognize pharmaceuticals as patented matter.
109.
Bass, supra note 108, at 191.
110.
Parmar & Divan, supra note 11.
111.
TRIPS and Development, supra note 105, at 5.
112.
Id. Compulsory licensing can only be used in exceptional circumstances
such as a national emergencies, or under specified conditions such as when adequate
remuneration is paid to the patent holder.
113.
Id. at 6.
114.
Nerozzi, supra note 25, at 615.
115.
Id. at 620. Developed countries raise three secondary issues for a narrow
interpretation of TRIPS: (1) the concessions TRIPS already grants to developing
countries; (2) the misuse and abuse of drugs in developing countries; and (3) fear of
black market or parallel trade. Id. at 621.
116.
Id. at 617.
117.
Id. at 624.
118.
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round Vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS]; North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M.
612 [hereinafter NAFTA].
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sale, selling, or importing the product without the owner's consent. 119
Rights articulated in NAFTA are similar. 120 Patent protection
philosophically conveys the power for a company to discriminate in
pricing between countries because the patent holder in each country
12 1
can enjoin unauthorized distribution including parallel imports.
122
However, parallel trade is largely permitted in most countries.
The
concept of parallel trade is centered on the "exhaustion" of patent
rights and protection.' 2 3 After a product containing an intellectual
property right is sold, the intellectual property owner no longer has
control over the fate of that product. 124 His rights have been
exhausted. 125 Once a patent becomes exhausted, the initial purchaser
may resell the product without infringing on the original seller's
26
patent right.1
Parallel trade frustrates intellectual property holder attempts to
maximize the value of their property rights. 12 7 Intellectual property
rights are granted and enforced at a national level; thus, intellectual
128
property holders must seek protection in each country individually.
Because there is no international standard on parallel trade, the
legality of barriers to parallel trade, such as laws regulating
exhaustion, depend on national laws. 129 Due to inequities in
pharmaceutical prices between countries and their varying laws
regulating (or not regulating) parallel trade, the pharmaceutical
industry's profits can easily be affected by parallel trade.
While exhaustion is mentioned in TRIPS, it is largely left
unregulated. 130 Article 6 of TRIPS simply states that "nothing in this
Agreement shall be used to address the issue of exhaustion of
intellectual property rights.' 131 Any conflicts between nations
concerning exhaustion are to be "resolved bilaterally between

119.
TRIPS, supra note 118.
120.
Id. art. 28; NAFTA, supra note 118, art. 1709.
121.
Danzon, supra note 71, at 296.
122.
Id.
123.
Shoell, supra note 105, at 163; see also Bryan Baer, Note, Price Controls
Through the Back Door: The Parallel Importationof Pharmaceuticals,9 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 109, 110 (2001) ("The most fundamental limitation on an intellectual property right...
is exhaustion upon first sale.").
124.
Baer, supra note 123, at 110.
125.
Id. This is commonly known as the first sale doctrine.
126.
Hillary A. Kremen, Note, Caveat Venditor: InternationalApplication of the
FirstSale Doctrine, 23 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 161, 162 (1997).
127.
Baer, supra note 123, at 111.
128.
Id. at 112.
129.
See Scherer, supra note 103.
130.
Shoell, supra note 105, at 164.
131.
TRIPS, supra note 118, art. 6.
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individual nations. '132 Thus, parallel trade remains an "entirely
133
domestic legal concern.
C. Case Studies in the United States and the European Union
1. The United States
The United States does not allow parallel imports. In Boesch v.
Graff, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a
dealer can purchase articles patented in another country and import
and sell them in the United States without the license or consent of
the owner of a U.S.-granted patent for the same invention. 134 Albert
Graff and J.F. Donnell filed suit against Emile Boesch and Martin
Bauer to recover for patent infringement of an improvement in lamp
burners. 13 5 The invention was patented in both the United States (to
Donnell & Co., represented by Graff and Donnell), and Germany (to
Carl Schwintzer and Wilhelm Graff). 136 Boesch and Bauer later
purchased the lamp burners in Germany from an authorized seller
there and imported and sold them in the United States without the
137
license or consent of the U.S. patent holder, Donnell & Co.
The Supreme Court held that although the laws of Germany
allow the selling of a product, this does not authorize the selling of
"articles in the United States in defiance of the rights of patentees
under a U.S. patent ....

The sale of articles in the United States

under a U.S. patent cannot be controlled by foreign laws.' 138 Thus,
where a patent for the same invention is held in both the United
States and another country, the U.S. patent holder's consent is
required before the invention may be purchased in the other country
and resold in the United States.
More recently, in October 2000, Congress passed legislation
authorizing reimportation of patented pharmaceuticals from Canada
into the United States subject to approval from the Department of
Health and Human Services. 139 Despite this, then Secretary of

132.
Id.
133.
Schoell, supra note 105, at 164.
134.
Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697, 702 (1890).
135.
Id. at 698.
136.
Id. at 699.
137.
Id. at 698.
138.
Id. at 703.
139.
Shubha Ghosh, Pills, Patents, and Power: State Creation of Gray Markets
as a Limit on Patent Rights, 53 FLA. L. REV. 789, 793-94 (2001) (referring to
congressional legislation of Oct. 2000 on reimports, H.R. Conf. Ref. No. 106-948, at 39
(2001) ('Making Appropriations for Agriculture Rural Development, Food and Drug
Administration, and Related Agencies Programs for the Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30,
2001, and for Other Purposes," amending 21 U.S.C. § 381 et seq.)).
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Health and Human Services, Donna Shalala, refused to authorize the
reimports, concerned that these pharmaceuticals would not meet U.S.
140
safety standards.
2. The European Union
Parallel trade has been permitted in Europe since the Treaty of
Rome and has recently become more common because the European
Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA) permits a drug to go through a
single registration process, involving safety, efficacy, and labeling
reviews. 141 Once approved by EMEA, the product may be placed on
the market in all European countries with standardized labeling and
dosage. 14 2 This greatly reduces costs to parallel wholesalers because
143
they do not have to repackage and re-label the product.
The European Union supports parallel trade. The first case
where the European Court of Justice applied exhaustion of rights to
patents was Centrafarm v. Sterling.144 Sterling Drug Inc. held
patents in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands for a drug.
Centrafarm purchased the drug in England and imported it into the
Netherlands, benefiting from the fact that the price in England was
fifty percent lower than that in the Netherlands. 145 Sterling Drugs
brought an action in the Netherlands for infringement of its Dutch
patent. 146 The case was referred to the European Court of Justice
(ECJ). 147 The court held that once a product has been put on the
market by the patentee or with his consent, his intellectual property
right is exhausted and may no longer be invoked to prevent parallel
imports. 148 The ECJ's ruling is based on the assumption that the
right to first marketing, guaranteed by a patent, provides sufficient
149
opportunity for the patentee to reap the rewards of his invention.

140.
Id. at 794, citing Robert Pear, In a Turnaround, White House Kills DrugImport Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2000, at Al; Marc Kaufman, Shalala Halts Bid to
Lower Drug Costs; ReimportationBill's 'FatalFlaws' Cited, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2000,
at Al; Alissa J. Rubin, Plan Dropped to Reimport U.S. Made Medications, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 27, 2000, at Al.
141.
See Danzon, supra note 6.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.

144.

Centrafarm v. Sterling, 2 C.M.L.R. 480 (1974).

145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

149.
David Perkins et al., Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights-The EU
Perspective, Practicing Law Institute, San Francisco (Nov. 1999). The ECJ defined the
subject matter of a patent as
[Tihe guarantee that the patentee, to reward the creative effort of the inventor,
has the exclusive right to use an intervention with a view to manufacturing
industrial products and putting them into circulation for the first time, either

546

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 37.527

However, this was not the case because the price for the drug in the
United Kingdom was kept artificially low by government interference
while at the same time parallel imports into the higher priced Dutch
market eroded profits there. 150 Thus, Sterling Drug was unable to
control its reward. 151 The ECJ did not agree with this argument,
152
instead asserting the primacy of free trade.
153
In Merck v. Stephar, the ECJ again found that a patent right
had been exhausted in circumstances where no parallel patent
protection was available in the Member State where the product had
first been marketed. 154 Merck held patents for its drug Moduretic in a
number of Member States, but not in Italy, where at the time, no
patent protection for pharmaceuticals was available. 15 5 Consequently,
there was a thriving domestic generic industry in Italy and prices
were low. 156 Nonetheless, Merck sold its drug on the Italian
market. 157 Stephar then imported the drug from Italy to the Dutch
market at a price below Merck's retail price there. 158 Merck brought
159
proceedings against Stephar for infringement on its Dutch patent.
The ECJ held that by putting the drug on the Italian market, it had
exhausted its patent rights, despite the fact that there was no patent
protection there. 160 The legal effect was that if a patentee put its drug
on the Italian market, it had no ability to obtain a reward for its
161
invention, undermining its patents in other Member States.
Commercially, until Italy changed its laws to patent pharmaceuticals,
companies delayed or restricted supply of essential drugs on the
162
Italian market.
Finally, In Merck v. Primecrown,163 the ECJ again affirmed the
primacy of free trade over patent protection. 164 The ECJ held that a
manufacturer's patent rights are exhausted EU-wide once a product

directly or by the grant of licenses to third parties, as well as the right to
impose infringement.
150.

Id.

151.

Id.

152.
153.

Id.
Merck v. Stephar, 3 C.M.L.R. 463 (1981).

154.

Id.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
(1997).
164.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Merck v. Stephar, 3 C.M.L.R. 463 (1981).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Joined Cases C-267/95 and C-268/95, Merck v. Primecrown, 1 C.M.L.R. 83
Id.
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is placed on the market in any EU country. 165 This holds even where
the exporting country does not recognize patents and the effect of
parallel trade is to nullify the patent holder's rights in the importing
66
country.1
D. Analysis
Several reasons have been advanced for the differences in U.S.
and other countries' attitudes toward parallel trade. First, because
most pharmaceutical companies are based in the United States, it is
suggested that the United States has a strong interest in protecting
pharmaceutical company profits. 167 By allowing parallel trade,
168
pharmaceutical prices drop, causing U.S. companies to lose profits.
Second, as expressed in Merck, the European Union and other
countries allowing parallel trade place great value on relatively
unrestricted trade. 169 Finally, it has been suggested that the incentive
to control health-care spending has increased as EU governments
attempt to limit their budget expenditures to comply with the
170
Maastricht Treaty.
Proponents of parallel trade advance the argument that it is
171
consistent with principles of free trade established by the WTO.
However, while restricting parallel trade will consequently decrease
the liberalization of markets, this argument ignores the consequences
that parallel trade places on both developing countries and the
development of new medicines. When prices among national markets
largely differ and parallel imports are permitted, a manufacturer has
three options: (1) maintain differential pricing, (2) set a higher
uniform price worldwide, or (3) market the drug exclusively in high
price countries. 172 Under each option, developing countries are
adversely affected. Where a manufacturer takes the first option, a
parallel trader may purchase mass quantities of the product in low
price countries and re-import into higher priced countries,
undercutting the price there and reducing profits. 173 While prices will
fall in high price markets, prices will rise in low price markets due to
increased demand of the product as a result of a new consumer, the
parallel trader. 174 Consequently, a uniform price emerges and

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id.
Schoell, supranote 105, at 167.
Id.
Merck v. Stephar, 1 C.M.L.R. 83 (1997).
Danzon, supra note 71, at 297.
Baer, supra note 123, at 129.
Id. at 127-28.
Id. at 128.

174.

Id.
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developing countries pay more for the product. 175 On the other hand,
companies may respond to parallel trade by increasing the price in
the low price countries to deter the incentive for parallel trade. This
may result in a worldwide uniform price. This will lead to the third
option inevitably chosen because developing countries will not be able
to afford a higher price. Consumers in developing countries, then, are
denied essential medicines. 176 Thus, under each option, parallel trade
harms developing countries by decreasing or denying access to
essential pharmaceuticals.

V. THE INTERACTION OF INTERNATIONAL REFERENCE PRICING AND
PARALLEL TRADE

A. Economic Implications
A significant characteristic of R&D as distinguished from
marginal cost for pricing purposes is that R&D is a global joint sunk
cost. 1 77 The cost is the same regardless of the number of consumers or
countries served. 178 The problem of pricing to cover joint R&D costs is
exacerbated by the fact that these costs are largely sunk by the time
of product launch and price negotiation. 179 Marginal costs, on the
other hand, account for approximately thirty percent of total cost. i8 0
Purchasers are inclined to free-ride, paying only their user-specific
marginal cost, leaving others to pay the joint sunk-costs.18 1 Where
product markets are either highly competitive or monopsonistic (i.e.
where there is a sole purchaser), prices are driven down to marginal
cost.182

The incentive for parallel trade is a sufficient difference in prices
between the exporting country and importing country to cover
shipping and transaction costs and still offer gains to both
countries. l8 3 A monopsonistic government purchaser has the leverage
to drive prices down to the country-specific marginal cost since any
producer will rationally continue to supply a product as long as the
price covers marginal cost.18 4 These countries, then, free-ride off

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
Danzon, supra note 71, at 295.
Id.
Id. at 296.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Danzon, supra note 71, at 296.
Id. at 295.
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others that pay the joint cost of R&D. 185 Because R&D expenses may
account for up to thirty percent of product output, and some
countries' are paying more than their fair share of R&D expenses due
to free-riding behavior, a sufficient difference in prices between
countries develops. 186 This situation provides the opportunity for both
87
parallel trade and international reference pricing to take over.'
Since there are no barriers to parallel trade in most countries
and the incentive of sufficient price differentials is present, those
countries whose governments are paying more for pharmaceuticals to
cover R&D expenses may now import pharmaceuticals from lower
price countries, reducing direct manufacturer purchases and R&D
profit. 188 Moreover, with the use of international reference pricing,
countries formerly covering R&D expenses are now inclined to utilize
their monopsony power to free-ride using other free-riding countries'
prices as justification for their economic behavior.' 8 9 Such domestic
international reference pricing reduces domestic prices across the
board to the lower foreign price level, and hence, is equivalent to 100
percent parallel trade. 190
In EU countries, the government is either the monopoly provider
of national health insurance, as in the United Kingdom and Italy, or
is heavily involved in regulating the quasi-private social insurance
funds, as in Germany, France, and the Netherlands. 191 A regulator of
a country that accounts for only a small percentage of global
pharmaceutical revenues may reason that its failure to contribute to
the global joint costs of R&D will have a negligible impact on the
future supply of medicines. 192 However, parallel trade and
international reference pricing permit diffusion of low prices from one
country to other countries. 193 Pharmaceutical sales in the United
Kingdom account for about three percent of the world market. 194 As a
result, a cut in prices for pharmaceuticals in the United Kingdom
would seem only to effect global R&D returns. 195 However, if a
sufficient number of countries cut their prices, this could have a more
cumulative effect of seriously damaging global R&D. 196 Moreover, UK
prices actually directly feed into the pricing schemes of many other

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
in the U.S.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Danzon, supra note 71, at 296.
Id. at 294.
Patricia Danzon, Price Discriminationfor Pharmaceuticals:Welfare Effects
and EU, 4 INT'L J. ECON. Bus. 301, 306 (1997).
Id.
Id.
Bloom & Van Reenen, supranote 57, at 322.
Id.
See id.
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countries utilizing international reference pricing. 19 7 Seemingly
insignificant reductions in UK prices can thus have a broader global
effect.
A pharmaceutical manufacturer's profit-maximizing response to
the increase in parallel trade and international reference pricing
driving down prices will be to set a single uniform price in all markets
connected through trade or international price comparisons. 198
Already, several major multinational companies attempt to obtain a
uniform launch price throughout the European Union for new
drugs. 1 99 For example, on February 24, 2003, a pharmaceutical
company, Roche, announced that it was setting a European price of
fifty-two euros a day, or more than $20,000 a year, for its new AIDS
drug, Fuzeon. 20 0 The drug's cost is abnormally high compared to other
AIDS-related medicines. 20 1 The company, however, has justified this
cost by the need to recoup R&D expenses. 20 2 At the time of this
writing, the price had not been set for the United States.20 3 However,
David Reddy, head of Roche's HIV products, said it would be in line
with U.S. products, even though drugs in the United States have
typically been priced five to twenty-five percent more than those in
European countries. 20 4 If Roche's new drug is priced similarly in the
United States and the European Union, it would be an indication that
Roche is attempting to set a more uniform launch price, perhaps to
prevent international reference pricing and parallel trade from
affecting its recoup of R&D expenses.
Uniform pricing will adversely affect both consumers in
traditionally low price countries (such as those in unindustrialized
countries where manufacturers are currently altruistically inclined to
reduce prices to increase access) as well as those in traditionally high
price countries. 20 5 Consumers in traditionally low price countries will
face higher prices and possibly loss of access to innovative drugs, even
though they would have been willing to pay a price sufficient to cover

197.
Id. at 324. Countries including UK prices into the reference basket include
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
and Spain.
198.
See Danzon, supra note 71, at 299.
199.
Id. at 300. Glaxo accepted a delay for several years for Imigran, an
antimigraine in France rather than accept a low price that would have undercut its
higher price elsewhere. In 1996, Merck launched Crixivan, a protease inhibitor at a
common EU price.
200.
Alison Langled & Melody Petersen, AIDS Drug is Priced by Roche, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 2003, at Wi.
201.
Id.
202.
Id.
203.
Id.
204.
Id.
205.
Danzon, supra note 71, at 295.
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the marginal cost under differential pricing. 20 6 Consumers in initially
high price countries may benefit if the uniform price is below the
price they would have paid with differential prices. 20 7 In the long run,
however, as revenue declines under uniform pricing, the supply of
innovative medicines will be reduced, eliminating some products they
2 08
would have been willing to pay for.
B. Legal Implications
The obstacles to improving the economic structure of the
pharmaceutical market primarily consist of inadequate restrictions,
lack of uniform laws on parallel trade, and a complete lack of
regulation or law on international reference pricing. Once a
pharmaceutical company obtains a patent on a product, the company
negotiates the price it will receive for sale of the patented product
with governments on a country-by-country basis. 20 9 If the company
and government reach an agreeable price, the transaction is
complete. 210 If an agreement cannot be reached, the company has two
options: (1) sell for a lower price, or (2) deny supply. 211 Under both
options, international reference pricing and parallel trade may take
212
place.
In the event that the company sells for a lower price, this price
may now serve as a reference under which other countries will use to
negotiate prices for the same or similar products. 213 Through setting
a lower price which the company will sell the product to one country,
they may also functionally set a ceiling for all subsequent
2 14
transactions.
If the company simply walks away from the transaction and
denies supply of the product to the country, that country may then
parallel import the same product from another country that has
chosen to buy at a lower price, such as from a developing country. 215
Thus, under the current market system, without legal constraints,
reference pricing and parallel trade create a negative impact.

206.
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208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 296.
Danzon, supra note 71, at 296.
Id.
See id. at 297.
Id.
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I. THE Rx
The ideal solution would integrate three objectives: (1) allow for
the promotion of pharmaceutical R&D, (2) create incentives for
pharmaceutical companies to provide essential medicines to
underdeveloped countries at an affordable cost (encourage differential
pricing), and (3) promote principles of free trade. Essential to
promoting R&D is to maintain income from sales adequate to cover
research and marginal costs, as well as to generate manufacturer
profit. 216 While patents are intended to ensure these objectives, most
countries dilute their effectiveness through parallel trade and
international reference pricing. 217 Thus, patent protection must be
enhanced. If pharmaceutical companies are to provide affordable,
essential medicines to developing countries (at costs insufficient to
cover R&D), they must be assured that those discounted prices do not
leak into developed countries. Otherwise, R&D costs cannot be
recouped and either essential medicines will no longer be developed,
or manufacturers will discontinue the practice of providing affordable
medicines to those who cannot otherwise afford them. This objective
calls for protection against price leakages. Finally, most countries
place great value on the notion of free trade. Any objective aimed at
eliminating free trade altogether, including the free trade of
pharmaceuticals, is unrealistic. Thus, some level of free trade with
regard to pharmaceuticals must be maintained.
While parallel trade is widely acknowledged and discussed, legal
commentators have largely ignored international reference pricing as
a contributing factor in the pharmaceutical dilemma and as an area
of potential regulation or reform in reaching a solution. 218 Most legal
proposals on this topic have dealt primarily or exclusively on
restricting or eliminating parallel trade.2 19 This is theoretically a
good solution for rectifying the first two objectives. However, if
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Id.
217.
Danzon, supra note 71, at 297.
218.
The lack of attention given to international reference pricing may be due to
the lack of any international guidance or regulation on the practice.
219.
See generally Ellen 't Hoen, Public Health and InternationalLaw: TRIPS,
PharmaceuticalPatents, and Access to Essential Medicines:a Long Way From Seattle to
Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27 (2002); Ghosh, supra note 139; Shanker A. Singham,
Symposium: Third Annual Latin American Competition and Trade Round Table:
Competition Policy and the Stimulation of Innovation: TRIPS and the Interface
Between Competition and Patent Protection in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 26
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 363 (2000); Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel
Trade in the PharmaceuticalIndustry: Implications for Innovation, Consumer Welfare,
and Health Policy, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 185 (1999).
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parallel trade is restricted or eliminated, free trade no longer exists,
or is at least greatly burdened. Thus, this solution fails to incorporate
the third objective. These proposals have not been successful because
most countries staunchly guard freedom of trade. The lack of success
with the extensive commentary on eliminating parallel trade
exemplifies the need to incorporate the third objective of free trade
into a solution.
The most efficient way to regulate international reference pricing
would be for the United States (the only developed country that does
not use international reference pricing for pharmaceuticals, thus
bearing a disproportionate portion of R&D expenses as compared to
other developed countries) to enter into a series of free trade
agreements (FTAs) with other developed countries that use
international reference pricing for pharmaceuticals. These FTAs
would establish pricing principles restricting or limiting reference
2 20
pricing.
An initial obstacle to this proposal is that developed countries
whose citizens are financially benefiting from the practice of
international reference pricing are unlikely to restrict or eliminate
the practice, at least on purely economic grounds. In this regard, the
United States, the pharmaceutical companies and countries utilizing
international reference pricing would need to discuss incentive
options for these countries' cooperation.
Bilateral trade agreements between the United States and
developed countries utilizing reference pricing offer the greatest
opportunity for success. Over the past decade, there has been a trend
221
toward bilateral trade agreements to resolve trade interests.
Bilateral, as opposed to multilateral agreements, allow for more
expedient resolution of trade issues because participating
governments need only resolve the trade issues specific to their
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The incorporation of provisions for pricing principles into future FTAs was
set forth in H.R. 1942, introduced by Representatives Crane, Dreier, and Johnson on
May 26, 1999.
221.
S. Tamer Cavusgil, Globalization of Markets and Its Impact on Domestic
Institutions, Symposium: The Globalizationof Law, Politics, and Markets: Implications
for Domestic Law Reform, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 83, 91 (1993). The United
States has current or future FTA negotiations with Chile, Singapore, Morocco, Latin
America (FTAA), and Australia, among others. The United States/Jordan FTA is an
example of a successful bilateral FTA. Agreement on the Establishment of a Free
Trade Area, Oct. 24, 2000, U.S.-Jordan, available at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/eumed/middleeast/textagr.pdf. In December 1999, Jordan became the 136th WTO
member. Through the WTO accession process, Jordan amended all of its intellectual
property and related legislation, including bringing its patent and Unfair Competition
and Trade Secrets Law to meet international standards. Jordan additionally provided
for linkage between regulatory and intellectual property authorities to ensure the full
weight of its government stood behind its intellectual property commitments. The
U.S./Jordan FTA framework illustrates the possibilities of how these objectives may be
realized.
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relationship. Moreover, with fewer governments participating in
222
negotiations, fewer competing interests and conflicts will ensue.
Procedurally, the recent signing of the Trade Promotion
Authority (TPA) legislation gives the U.S. President proper
congressional guidance to move forward with a proactive trade
agenda. 223 If the United States is successful in negotiating FTAs
requiring developed countries to restrict or eliminate reference
pricing in place of a free market system, pharmaceutical
manufacturers may be more motivated by the potential to recoup
R&D costs to invest more in future R&D. Similarly, with the decrease
in reference pricing, the United States will no longer pay as
disproportionate share of R&D expenses.

VII. CONCLUSION

Applied to patented pharmaceuticals, international reference
pricing and parallel trade coincide to decrease R&D incentives,
decrease access to affordable pharmaceuticals in underdeveloped
countries, and inhibit equitable R&D cost-sharing between developed
countries. Presently, there is no international regulation on
international reference pricing and very little on parallel trade. While
the concept of parallel trade has been highly analyzed and
commented upon, scant legal literature discusses international
reference pricing, a current area of discussion amongst some
economists. The best approach to promoting pharmaceutical R&D
and encouraging pharmaceutical companies to provide affordable
medicines to underdeveloped countries, while maintaining free trade,
is through a system of bilateral trade agreements.
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As a hypothetical, suppose the United States is only able to convince
country A to partially restrict reference pricing, possibly by limiting the "basket" of
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country B in the second case. In such a situation, bilateral trade agreements are the
best option.
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